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In recent years, the legal academy has been experiencing a
strong renewed interest in empirical legal research. Referred to by
various analysts as a "new legal realism" or as "empirical legal
studies," this restored focus on the social sciences in many ways
echoes an earlier era of legal realism in American law, with some
important differences.'
Within the legal academy, empiricism may seem to be a new
discovery; however, there has been continuous intellectual concern
Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation; Professor, University of Wisconsin
Law School; Affiliated Faculty, Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin. My thanks
to Ed Rubin and the participants in the conference for stimulating discussions of issues
pertaining to our research and to the future of legal education more generally.
1. For a general description, see Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: New Legal Realism
Symposium: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, and in particular, see
Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: "Things Ain't What They Used To
Be", 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 391-403.
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with social science research on legal topics for many decades now,
most notably embodied in the Law and Society movement.2 At the
same time, there has been growing interest in introducing possible
reforms to the U.S. system of legal education, an interest to which this
Symposium issue gives eloquent expression.
This Article combines these two themes: empirical research on
law and careful examination of legal education. It reports on an
empirical study of legal education, which I have been conducting
under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation (a research
institute that also has been actively developing an interdisciplinary
program of research on law for many decades). 3 After discussing that
study, I will consider its implications for the teaching of law. This
Article raises the core issue of how law works when it translates
information about the wider society into legal language, from social
science findings to the nitty-gritty details of plaintiffs' and defendants'
lives. For example, when attorneys ask expert witnesses questions
about social science findings on the stand, they are using a legal
framework that is often at odds with some of the basic assumptions of
the social science discipline in question. Plaintiffs and defendants may
understand the conflict addressed in court much differently than do
the legal professionals who are translating their stories into legally-
viable frames.
I argue for a more rigorous approach to conceptualizing and
teaching this process of legal translation. Legal professionals may
have to change or distort the results of social science research to serve
their clients' cases, or to fit within the applicable doctrinal categories,
but they can at least begin with a better understanding of the issues
involved. We generally do not train law students in the standards of
assessment used by social science to evaluate assertions about people
and society. Both legal professionals and social scientists sometimes
proceed as if their fields operated from the same basic standards and
2. Since 1964, the U.S. Law and Society Association has been working actively to bring
together social scientists and law professors interested in interdisciplinary research on law and
to publish peer-reviewed material in its flagship journal, The Law & Society Review.
International interest in the area is apparent from the 2006 joint meetings to be held in Berlin
which will bring together law-and-society scholars from around the world.
3. See American Bar Foundation, Home Page, http://www.abf-sociolegal.org (last visited
Jan. 6, 2007). The opening paragraph of the ABF's Home Page reads:
Established in 1952, the American Bar Foundation is an independent,
nonprofit national research institute committed to objective empirical
research on law and legal institutions. This program of socio-legal research is
conducted by an interdisciplinary staff of Research Fellows trained in such
diverse fields as law, sociology, psychology, political science, economics,
history, and anthropology.
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epistemological assumptions. We do not give much systematic thought
to the ways the fields of law and social science differ, or to what is
involved when we move between them. I contend that this kind of
rigorous thought should be central to any new legal realist or
empirical project in the legal academy.
I. INSIDE THE LAW SCHOOL
As legal scholars return to a focus on the empirical study of
law, they inevitably confront the question of method: what are the
best social science methods for studying law "on the ground"?
Although some would argue for a limited set of preferred empirical
methods, a consensus seems to be emerging that a neutral approach to
selecting methods is important so that the chosen methods will fit the
questions asked.4 For example, quantitative and qualitative methods
give us different kinds of information, as do experimental and
econometric approaches. Large-scale survey and statistical studies
provide a better sense of how general a pattern is, but do a poor job of
sensitively tracking subjects' own understandings of events.
5
4. For example, Vanderbilt law professor Tracey George advocates "a model-based
approach coupled with a quantitative method" as the preferred way of studying law empirically,
urging that scholars combine "a positive theory of a law or legal institution," which should then
be tested using "quantitative techniques developed in the social sciences." Tracey George, An
Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law
Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 05-20, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=775864.
However, ABF Director (and Northwestern sociology professor) Robert Nelson notes that
"theoretically driven research that uses multiple methods can produce stronger validity claims,
can better illuminate the social mechanisms through which law operates, and may lead to
research findings that more readily translate to broader publics." Posting of Robert Nelson to
Empirical Legal Studies, http://www.elsblog.org/the.empiricaljegal-studi/2006/06/
combining.quant.html (June 21, 2006, 16:44 EST). Cornell law professor Michael Heise, a
founder of Empirical Legal Studies, similarly notes:
I've always been of the mind that different methodological approaches
possess different blends of strengths and weaknesses and that none possess
an exclusive lock on advancing knowledge. To be sure, certain research
questions, designs, and data might lend themselves more appropriately to
one methodology or another. But using 'multiple methods,' where appropriate
and helpful, strikes me as a good idea.
Posting of Michael Heise to Empirical Legal Studies, http://www.elsblog.org/
theempirical legal_studi2006/06/ combining.quant.html (June 21, 2006, 15:59 EST); see also
The New Legal Realism: It's Not About Breakfast Blog Forum, http://www.elsblog.org/
the-empirical-legal-studi/blog-forumlindex.html (June 19-23, 2006). There are a variety of ways
of defining "empirical," but what they have in common is an emphasis on experience and
observation, which are core features of a variety of social science methods. In disciplines such as
history, of course, the original data are of necessity more archival, but this can be true in other
fields as well.
5. In their well-known text on the use of social science in legal decisions, Monahan and
Walker discuss the way social science studies generally make trade-offs in methodological
precision. When researchers attempt to achieve higher "internal validity" within a study, they
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Participant observation has the advantage of generating more
accurate information about subjects' cultural and social frameworks
and also often gives us a better picture of what is actually happening
than do self-reports; people may behave in observably different ways
than indicated by their self-reports on surveys. 6 However, as studies
use experimental kinds of methods that permit them to gain tight control of the research
situation. When they do that, we can be more certain that the conclusions reached are true of
this particular experimental situation. In other words, the effects of one kind of factor on an
outcome are more certain because the researcher has created an artificial situation in which only
that factor varies-as, for example, if two otherwise similar groups of college students are asked
to complete the same task but given slightly different instructions. We are surer that the
variation in instructions is the cause of any differences we find in how the students do the task,
because we have held constant other kinds of factors that might influence the outcome. However,
if we want to assume that the average juror will make a similar decision, we face some great
difficulties, because the artificial experimental situation is not real life. Jurors are likely to be
more diverse demographically. And we cannot assume that they will make decisions in the same
way when faced with a real-life death penalty situation, for example, as they do when they are
dealing with a hypothetical situation in an experimental setting.
Researchers who aim for higher "external validity" want to be able to generalize what they
find in their studies with more certainty to real-life situations. They may decide to settle for less
internal validity in order to achieve this:
Often a research strategy that yields results high in internal validity does so
at the cost of leaving external validity questions unanswered, and vice versa.
A study randomly assigning collegiate "jurors" [i.e., college students
pretending to be jurors] to deliberate in groups of either 6 or 12 would have
high internal validity as a test of the effects of jury size, but would be open to
the external validity issue of generalization across persons (college students
versus real jurors). A study of "naturally" occurring instances in which real
juries have consisted of 6 as compared with 12 jurors would have high
external validity, but would leave many internal validity questions (e.g., how
were the cases tried ... ?). The choice of which type of validity to maximize
and which to sacrifice is a hotly debated issue in the social sciences. Usually,
researchers reach some sort of pragmatic compromise. They trade-off a bit of
internal validity to achieve a higher level of external validity, and vice versa.
JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND METHODS 66 (6th ed.
2006).
6. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz, for example, long ago made the case that
anthropological methods do a better job of capturing what is happening on the ground than do
more removed methods. If we want to understand how people perceive their own lives, we may
have to stand for a moment in their shoes, rather than imposing our own analytical categories
(as will increasingly occur when we move to more structured research instruments). We find this
argument in Geertz's famous essay, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective,
(first given as the Storrs Lectures at the Yale Law School), where he states:
[Fields like anthropology] may have more to offer us in making our way
through such perplexities as the shape-shifting nature of the fact/law
distinction across cultural traditions and historical phases than supposedly
more 'scientific' enterprises, where everything that arises must converge. If
there is any message . . . , it is that the world is a various place, various
between lawyers and anthropologists, various between Muslims and
Hindus.... and much is to be gained, scientifically and otherwise, by
confronting that grand actuality rather than wishing it away in a haze of
forceless generalities and false comforts.
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grow more detailed and accurate about law on the ground, the focus is
narrowed and it is more difficult to assess how they can be
generalized. For this reason, leading socio-legal scholars have urged
empirical legal researchers to combine multiple methods where
possible, to consider evidence from studies using a variety of
approaches, and/or to take care in fitting research questions to
research methods (and in being appropriately modest about the reach
of their results).
7
The study on which I report here examined the linguistic
interactions between professors and students in eight different law
schools in great detail.8 The question animating the research was
whether law school pedagogy has a shared linguistic structure and/or
epistemological message across otherwise quite diverse classrooms
(which varied in terms of professorial teaching styles, the forms of
student responses to their professors, and other non-linguistic
characteristics of professors, students, and law schools). My research
team also examined differences among the classes we studied, asking
how a variety of factors interacted to create more and less inclusive
classrooms for students.9 In-class observation and taping were clearly
necessary to address these research questions. I drew on the methods
of linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics, which insist on detailed
observation of classroom exchanges and on the use of verbatim
linguistic data.10  Interestingly, a recent research report to be
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 234
(3d ed. 2000). In other words, it is easier to catch and understand the divergence between our
own thought and that of our research subjects when we live beside them for an extended time,
absorbing their way of life and attitudes.
7. See supra note 4 (on the issue of combining methods); see also CHARLES C. RAGIN,
CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL RESEARCH: THE UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF METHOD 26, 47-52, 78-79, 99.
100 (1994) (discussing, inter alia, benefits of data triangulation in which results obtained by use
of various methods are brought together, and explaining how to choose research methods to fit
questions asked). For an example of a discussion of methodological tradeoffs in the context of a
particular kind of research-here, network analysis-see Karen Zwijze-Konnig & Menno de Jong,
Auditing Information Structures in Organizations: A Review of Data Collection Techniques for
Network Analysis, 8 ORGANIZATIONAL RES. METHODS 429, 435, 437 (2005) (noting that self-report
methods are subject to distortions such as producing socially desirable (rather than accurate)
answers, forgetting, telescoping, differing interpretations of the questions asked, etc.).
8. See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK LIKE A
LAWYER" (paperback ed. 2007); see also Elizabeth Mertz, Wamucii Njogu & Susan Gooding, What
Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge for Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1998).
9. As with any study of this scope, the research was conducted by a team that worked to
tape and code classrooms, create and code transcripts, and help in phases of data analysis. I am
most fortunate to have worked with a very gifted team in this study, including the two Project
Managers, Susan Gooding and Nancy Matthews, and Wamucii Njogu, who oversaw the
quantitative analysis.
10. Anthropological linguistics and sociolinguistics focus on the details of linguistic
interchanges, tracing how language interacts with its social context to convey meaning and
impact social events. See generally ALESSANDRO DURANTI, LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY (1997);
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published by the Carnegie Foundation reached very similar
conclusions, based on a somewhat different methodology."
For the study, I selected schools from across the "indigenous"
U.S. status hierarchy of law schools, with three from the
"elite/prestige" category, two from the "regional" category, and three
from the "local" category. 12 I also varied the gender and race of the
professors studied. The result was a comparative set of in-depth case
studies. 13 The entire first semester of classes in each school was tape-
recorded, while in-class observers also coded aspects of the classroom
interactions. The tapes were then transcribed. Transcripts, tapes, and
in-class coding sheets formed the basis for a new coding process,
tracking aspects of each in-class turn (such as length of turn,
gender/race of speakers, and whether the turn was volunteered or
called-on). Coders also generated an ethnographic account of each
class meeting, noting aspects of the developing classroom culture, such
as the use of humor and how social context was discussed. These were
used to create overall ethnographic summaries for each classroom in
the study. I personally performed the in-class coding and taping of one
PETER TRUDGILL, SOCIOLINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY (4th ed.,
Penguin Books 2000) (1974). For discussions of how these techniques are used to study
education, see LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY OF EDUCATION (Stanton Wortham & Betsy Rymes
eds., 2002); THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF LITERACY (Jenny Cook-Gumperz ed., 2006).
11. THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING
LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (forthcoming 2007) (draft report
manuscript, on file with the author). I thank the Carnegie researchers for sharing their results
with me prior to official publication. Their study of law school education was conducted under the
aegis of their "Preparation for the Professions Program," which also sponsored studies of clergy,
engineering, medical, and nursing training. See The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement
of Teaching, Program Areas, http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/programs (last visited January
6, 2007). A team of typically four researchers from the Carnegie Foundation visited sixteen law
schools in the United States and Canada. The schools were diverse along a number of
dimensions: public versus private, geographical region, selectivity or status ranking,
freestanding versus part of a university, historically devoted to black or Native American people,
or noted for educational innovation. The research team spoke with personnel, and visited classes
of every type; they also examined assessment methods, and interviewed students in each school.
In addition, they consulted with well-known scholars of law and of legal education. EDUCATING
LAWYERS, supra (manuscript at xxi-xxii (Introduction)). The Carnegie report will be published by
Jossey-Bass in 2007 as a book co-authored by William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch
Wegner, Lloyd Bond, and Lee S. Shulman.
12. I here treat the indigenous status hierarchy as the equivalent of any social caste
system: it is a system-internal way of differentiating among members, and socially constructed.
By contrast, people inside these hierarchical systems understand the status categories as
"natural" or as tracking inherent worth.
13. Because of the intensive nature of this research, the usual practice in classroom
ethnographies of this kind is to study only one or two classrooms. By expanding to classrooms in
eight different schools, we created a larger range of comparative cases than has been generally
obtained in this sort of research. The result is obviously not a random sample of the kind used by
sociologists as a basis for standard statistical analyses, but rather a rich comparative data set.
On the other hand, because we coded each turn, we can analyze the interactions quantitatively,
in general using descriptive statistics.
488
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of the schools, and interviewed six of the eight professors who
participated in the overall study. In schools where students were
willing to participate, we conducted small-group interviews as well.
The study combined qualitative and quantitative analyses to produce
a more accurate understanding of law school classroom dynamics.
14
Attention to the details of language and the context in which
they are used are hallmarks of a longstanding empirical tradition
emerging from anthropological linguistics, sociolinguistics,
conversation analysis, and other similar fields. Many standard
approaches to language analysis-both outside and within legal
scholarship-have generally stressed the "semantic" or decontextual
14. One of the many enjoyable aspects of doing this kind of research is that it has
inadvertently put me into a kind of tacit conversation with law students at a number of law
schools, who thus far seem to be the only other source of extensive observational reporting on law
school classroom dynamics. Enterprising law students at Yale, Harvard, and the University of
Chicago have organized to track gender dynamics at their law schools. The Yale students have
now in fact performed a second wave of the research. See YALE LAW WOMEN, YALE LAW SCHOOL
FACULTY AND STUDENTS SPEAK ABOUT GENDER: A REPORT ON FACULTY-STUDENT RELATIONS AT
YALE LAW SCHOOL (2002), available at http://www.yale.edu/ylw/YLW%20Gender%20Report.pdf
(last visited January 6, 2007); Adam Neufeld, Costs of an Outdated Pedagogy? Study on Gender
at Harvard Law School, 13. AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 511 (2005) (detailing a study of
how female and male experiences at Harvard Law differ and exploring what factors play a role in
these differences); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988) (describing both anecdotally and statistically the experiences of twenty
female Yale Law students and offering suggestions to improve legal education); Karen Wilson &
Sharon Levin, The Sex-Based Disparity in Classroom Participation, THE PHOENIX, Nov. 26, 1991,
at 3 (reporting, in a University of Chicago Law School student newspaper, that men speak in
class about twice as often as women).
Although student-run efforts generally do not cover large numbers of class sessions for any
individual class (nor can they perform more complex research tasks such as tracking timing of
turns, etc.), they do manage to report on a wide variety of classes within each school. Later
studies have added innovations such as having a male and female coder simultaneous code in
any class session that is being observed, tracking whether turns were volunteered or called-on,
and reporting outcomes as ratios rather than as raw numbers. I have very much enjoyed
following the growing conversation among law students as to how best to study and track
classroom dynamics, which I view as one hopeful avenue for encouraging an engaged and more
sophisticated exposure to empiricism for law students:
As an anthropologist who is also participating in the research in this area, I
have watched with great interest a process by which student-run
observational work appears to have built on itself over the years, with each
new study incorporating and improving on innovations from prior efforts (as
well as from other sources). At a time when there is a great deal of discussion
of how best to encourage empirical work in the legal academy, I think we
should take note of this kind of process; it is tempting for trained social
scientists to express only skepticism about efforts by legal professionals in
this regard, but absent formal graduate social science training for everyone
involved, it might be important to view the public discussion itself as a forum
for genuine interdisciplinary communication and advancement.
MERTZ, supra note 8, at 266 n.84. In this regard, some of the students may be ahead of their
professors in coming to understand some of the real difficulties and intricacies of using empirical
research to address policy issues.
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aspects of language meaning.' 5  However, recent research has
uncovered the crucial role played by "pragmatic," or contextually
dependent, aspects of language structure.' 6 It turns out that
pragmatic meaning is crucial to the process by which language
becomes a vehicle for conveying meaning, communicating feelings,
building relationships, resolving disputes, and so forth. It is through
these myriad functions that language becomes an important avenue
for creating and imposing social structure. Inevitably this brings with
it implications for power dynamics, in addition to the place of
language in conveying meaning that does not necessarily implicate
power.17 This study tracks the details of language pragmatics (as well
as semantics) across a full semester in eight different first-year
Contracts classrooms, located in a broad range of different law
schools.18
II. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES ACROSS LAW SCHOOL CLASSROOMS
As noted, the study on which this Article is based tracked two
basic kinds of patterns in law school classrooms. Both are patterns of
speech, discernable through careful analysis of linguistic interchanges.
First, I looked for any commonalities that might exist in the way
classroom discourse was structured, despite the many differences that
divide the classes, schools, students, and professors of this study.
Linguistic anthropologists have found that subtle cultural messages
15. See Elizabeth Mertz & Bernard Weissbourd, Legal Ideology and Linguistic Theory:
Variability and its Limits, in SEMIOTIC MEDIATION: SOCIOCULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 261, 265 (Elizabeth Mertz & Richard Parmentier eds., 1985); Elizabeth Mertz,
Tapping the Promise of Relational Contract Theory: "Real" Legal Language and a New Legal
Realism, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 909, 922 (2000).
16. Examples of pragmatic anchoring of speech include what linguists call "deictics," which
locate us in time and space as we communicate. Thus, locatives such as "here" and "there,"
personal pronouns such as "I" and "you," and verb tense ("I will tell him" versus "I told him")
depend on their contexts of use for important parts of their meaning.
17. There is an interesting debate over the issue of how or whether to analyze power
dynamics when looking at language. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES 45-56 (2006). My
book on the language of law school notes that:
Of course, where law intercedes, issues of power are never very far away. But
it is important to recognize as well how linguistic mediation introduces an
irreducible dynamic of its own, imbued with cultural creativity and
responsive to particular contexts and people. In this sense, I take seriously
Constable's admonition against reducing our understanding of law and
justice to a monolithic focus on power.
MERTZ, supra note 8, at 217.
18. The Carnegie Foundation team visited sixteen different law schools, which permitted
observation of classes across a still wider variety of schools and topics (although for shorter
periods of time), and, as noted above, came to some quite similar conclusions. EDUCATING
LAWYERS, supra note 11 (manuscript at xxi (Introduction)).
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can be encoded in discourse structure, so that any shared features of
law school classroom language are potential keys to a commonly-held,
distinctive legal worldview. Second, this study examined any
differences in linguistic patterning that emerged from observational
data obtained in the classrooms.
A. Shared Message: Learning to Speak, Read, and Think Like a
Lawyer
We found a great deal of variation, at the surface level, in the
linguistic patterning of the classrooms of this study. At the same time,
analysis at a deeper level shows that an identical message about
language is conveyed in all of these classrooms, and that message is
simultaneously about pragmatic or contextual structure and conveyed
through language pragmatics in the classroom. 19
I chose to hold the content of the teaching as constant as
possible, by taping only first-semester, first-year Contracts
classrooms. This eliminated the possibility that any differences found
among the classes were due to divergences among first-year subjects.
We selected first-year, first-semester classes because this is the time
period during which students experience their first re-orientation to
language as they enter their new chosen profession. It is the time
period that most closely approximates the first days of an initiation
rite, a time when entrants to a new social status are taught to shift old
patterns in favor of new ones.20 In the first year of medical school, for
example, medical students must undergo a change in their orientation
to the body, a shift seen most dramatically through the first semester
of gross anatomy lab. As they dissect human cadavers, students take
their first step into a new profession in which they must develop a
more removed and dispassionate approach often referred to as "the
clinical attitude."21 If we look now to the first-year law school
experience, we find a similar emphasis on learning to "think like a
lawyer."
What core re-orientation is required if a first-year student is to
"think like a lawyer"? In the gross anatomy lab, cultural norms
19. See Elizabeth Mertz, Recontextualization as Socialization: Text and Pragmatics in the
Law School Classroom, in NATURAL HISTORIES OF DISCOURSE 229, 245-46 (Michael Silverstein &
Greg Urban eds., 1996); Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and
Anthropological Translations, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 91, 101-02 (2000).
20. For a discussion of the concept of "liminal" states, which characterize the period of
initiation into a new social status, see ARNOLD VON GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE (1960), and
also VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS (1974).
21. See Peter Finkelstein, Studies in the Anatomy Laboratory: A Portrait of Individual and
Collective Defense, in INSIDE DOCTORING 22, 22-23 (Robert H. Coombs et al. eds., 1986).
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around reverence for the body and death are routinely violated, subtly
pushing students to give up old attitudes and adopt new ones.22 What
we found in the law school classroom was that linguistic norms are
ruptured as law students are urged to give up old approaches to
language and conflict and adopt new ones. "Thinking" like a lawyer
turns out to depend in important ways on speaking (and reading, and
writing) like a lawyer. This change is largely a matter of a shift in
language pragmatics, one that we can trace in different forms through
all of the classrooms examined in the study.
1. The Importance of Being Pragmatic
23
Researchers studying the interface of language and society
have found that it can be very useful to track the contextual
structuring of language. For example, anthropologists studying
political oratory have found that the contextual or pragmatic structure
of powerful political speech often subtly mirrors the very model of the
polity that the politician seeks to convey. 24 In other words, subtle
aspects of language work to reinforce or even create an underlying
orientation in the world. Ethnographers studying children in
classrooms have found that teachers working with students perceived
to be low status (whether because they are labeled "low ability" or
because of class or racial bias) send very different pragmatic cues than
do teachers working with children perceived to be higher status.25 In
everything from interruption patterns to how they cue children to
speak, teachers can convey very different messages.
22. Id.
23. Actually, more accurately, I should say "metapragmatic" here, but I have found that
this particular technical word has a very adverse affect on many legal audiences. (Something I
have trouble understanding, given that legal professionals deal with all manner of arcane
technical vocabulary.) By "metapragmatic," anthropological linguists mean to indicate the way
language functions at a "meta" level to monitor and transmit information about the pragmatic
meaning that we convey continually when we communicate. For example, if I say, "I don't want
to fight with you, I'm just trying to explain," I am attempting to use the metapragmatic level to
reorient your understanding of the ongoing flow of our speech. I am saying, "Don't interpret the
contextual signals I am sending as angry, please, interpret them as a mere attempt to explain."
This is a meta-level linguistic signal (language referring to itself).
24. Richard Parmentier describes this phenomenon in Belauan political oratory. See
Richard Parmentier, The Political Function of Reported Speech: A Belauan Example, in
REFLEXIVE LANGUAGE 261, 284 (John Lucy ed., 1993). Michael Silverstein, from whose work
many of these ideas originally developed, discusses the issue in his early paper. See Michael
Silverstein, Metaforces of Power in Traditional Oratory, Lecture to the Yale University
Anthropology Department (Feb. 1981) (transcript on file with the author).
25. See, e.g., James Collins, Differential Treatment and Reading Instruction, in THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF LITERACY 138, 144 (Jenny Cook-Gumperz ed., 2d ed. 2006); James Collins,
Language and Class in Minority Education, 14 ANTHROPOLOGY & EDUC. Q. 299, 315-17 (1988).
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Low status children are sent the message that the text they are
reading is simply something to be pronounced, and they are
interrupted and corrected continually as to mechanics. 26 This prevents
them from developing a sense of the text as something to be mined,
interpreted, and mastered-a message commonly sent to higher status
students. Of course, no one ever sits the children down and tells them,
"Don't bother trying to understand this-just see if you can pronounce
it properly." Indeed, a teacher might be shocked to hear that this is
the message he has conveyed. Nonetheless, it is conveyed through a
variety of subtle pragmatic cues, which speakers can mobilize without
being aware of what they are doing.
27
One linguistic measure that has been used in classroom studies
of language is that of "uptake structure." Linguists tracking uptake
look to see whether, once a student has responded to a teacher, the
teacher then incorporates some aspect of what that student said in the
next question. If the teacher takes up some part of the student's
response in a subsequent question, then the student has had an
impact on the classroom exchange (and vice versa). Perhaps not
surprisingly, there is far more uptake in high-status elementary
students' reading groups than in the low-status students' groups.
28
It might, however, come as something of a surprise to hear that
the most classic Socratic teaching resembles the low-status students'
classrooms in terms of uptake structure. The classic style of Socratic
questioning is characterized by low amounts of uptake.29 However,
when we examine how and when uptake happens, it becomes clear
that this (pragmatic or contextual) way of shaping language's meaning
is actually being used to refocus law students' attention on new
aspects of the text.30 Unlike the low-status students, law students are
being taught to master the text, but in a new way. They are taught to
read the text not only for its semantic content, but for the way it
points to contexts of legal authority. What was the status of the
authoring court in the hierarchy of courts? What was the procedural
stance of the case? What doctrinal categories (given in precedent by
26. See James Collins, Socialization to Text: Structure and Contradiction in Schooled
Literacy, in NATURAL HISTORIES OF DISCOURSE 203, 211 (Michael Silverstein & Greg Urban eds.,
1996).
27. See id. at 207-08 (asserting that teacher and peer corrections, disruptions, and use of
questions affect the way children orient to reading).
28. Id. at 221.
29. Mertz, Recontextualization as Socialization, supra note 19, at 242.
30. Id. at 240. The professor could rely on semantics-the content of what is said-to convey
this message, simply lecturing and telling the students that they must now pay attention to
different aspects of the texts that they are reading. But instead, when using uptake structure,
the professor is using the pragmatics-the contextual structuring of talk-to focus students'
attention on particular aspects of legal texts.
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the appropriate courts) or statutory provisions (again, enacted
correctly by authorized legal "agents") does the court discuss? Slowly
but surely, law students learn to listen for new aspects of the "conflict
stories" with which they are presented. They are taught to do this not
primarily through semantics, but through the restructuring, in
context, of the very language in which they discuss what they have
read. This, then, is a very different use of uptake and other contextual
features of language: one that pushes students into a new way of
talking, reading, and "thinking." The language structure of the most
canonical type of Socratic pedagogy provides the best example of
mirroring-where the message's form echoes and reinforces the
message's content. However, we find some form of contextual
mirroring in all of the classrooms of the study, whether the overt
discourse form is more or less Socratic, or even moves into primarily
lecture (as it did in one of the classrooms of the study).31 A ubiquitous
question-answer format, even when enacted entirely by the professor
in lectures (asking a question first and then answering it himself), is
used throughout all of the classes in this study to refocus students'
attention on layers of textual and legal authority.
32
Whether in Belauan political oratory, elementary school
classrooms, or law school classes, a great deal of quiet work is done
through the pragmatic structure of language. Questions of what
counts and what doesn't count, where to put our attention, and even a
felt sense of what the "correct" structure of an argument or a polity
should be can be shaped without our even realizing it, in the way our
language points to and helps to create the contexts in which we live.
2. Legal Language, Legal Epistemology, and Getting Our "Footing"
What, then, is the distinctive shape of the worldview or
epistemology conveyed in the law school classroom? Through careful
analysis of the structure of discourse in each classroom of the study,
we can find a distinctive legal approach. When students attempt to
tell the stories of conflict embodied in the cases assigned for their
31. See MERTZ, supra note 8, at 84-140 (Chapters 5 and 6). Chapter 5 tracks the way a
similar underlying message on textual authority is conveyed in classrooms with apparently quite
different discourse structures (modified Socratic, short exchange, and predominantly lecture). In
Chapter 6, I demonstrate how quite similar underlying dialogic or pair-part structures pervade
professorial talk in all classrooms, whether enacted between professor and student in one
ongoing exchange, between professor and students in multiple exchanges on the same case, or
within professor turns during lectures.
32. Id. at 43-83 (Chapter 4).
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courses, they typically start by focusing on the content of the story.33
First-year law professors insistently refocus the telling of these stories
on the sources of authority that give them power within a legal
framework. What was the court authorized to decide? If it writes
about hypothetical situations other than the one before it, students
learn, this part of the story is to be separated from the "holding"-the
authoritative part of the case. The holding is valid only if uttered by
the correct authority, following the correct procedure, delivered in the
correct form. This is a new and very different sense of where to look
when we decide what counts as a "fact," how to construct valid
accounts of events, and where to demand accuracy-as opposed to
permitting unsupported suppositions.
Over and over again, the professors in this study demanded
precision from their students on issues of legal-textual authority. 34 If
students did not reproduce the precise words required for one prong of
a legal test, the professor would continue to question the students
until a student spoke those words. 35 Professors reviewed the
procedural stance of cases, reminding students that on an appeal from
a motion to dismiss, the facts as stated in the case did not have the
same status as they would in an appeal from a jury trial. Regardless of
the status of the school or the philosophy of the professor, law
students were called to demonstrate increasing precision about the
texts, their institutional histories, and their relationships with other
texts (precedent, for example). At the same time, professors would
33. For example, in the following transcript excerpt, the professor interrupts a student who
is responding to a request that she state the facts of a case by trying to "tell the story" of the case
in a more usual, layperson's narrative frame:
Transcript 4.6 (3/3/3)
Prof.: Hi. Urn, can you start developing for us the arguments for the plaintiff and the
defendant. (.) Um, Ms. N.?
Ms. N.: Um, that the plaintiff was a young, youthful man // with II
Prof.: // great // the plaintiff was a beautiful
man (). [[class laughter]] Is that what you said?
Id. at 69 (use of /parallel lines// signals overlapping speech). It is quite usual to begin a story by
introducing the characters, in part by describing details of their physical appearance. The
professor, however, interrupts and then directs the student to skip this kind of narrative
introduction and move straight into a discussion of the legal issues:
Okay, all right, so there's a lot at stake in the choice of which branch of this
rule to apply in this particular fact situation. And all I'm interested in, Ms.
N., is what the arguments are, um, for cost of completion, which is what the
plaintiff wants in both cases, and what the arguments are for diminution in
value, which is what the defendant wants in both cases, all right? I want the
argument, okay? (3/3/4).
Id.
34. Id. at 43-96 (Chapters 4 and 5).
35. Id. at 65-66.
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sometimes permit wide-ranging discussions of the social contexts
within which the underlying disputes arose, after serious legal
analysis had been performed. During these discussions, all manner of
suppositions and hypothesized data about the social world were
permitted, with very little consideration of how to achieve greater
accuracy. 36 The move to focus on form, authority, and legal-linguistic
contexts is thus accompanied by a shift away from precision or depth
in discussions of content, morality, and social context.
Interestingly, the distinctive footnoting conventions used in
law reviews and peer-reviewed journals provide a snapshot of this
difference. Law reviews require a high degree of precision in the
citation to authority. Student editors diligently check each footnote in
an article to be sure that the citation's page number is correct and
that the text of the citation actually says what the article claims it
does. On the other hand, they usually cannot and do not check the
validity of the texts being cited themselves. 37 If the methodology of a
study being cited is faulty, the citation will still pass muster as long as
the footnote accurately quotes what is said in the faulty study. By
contrast, peer-reviewed journals rely on authors to be accurate about
page numbers (which may indeed be a leap of faith!). It is quite
possible to put the wrong page number into a footnote for a peer-
reviewed journal and get away with it. On the other hand, if one cites
a faulty study, ideally the peer reviewers will notice this. If the article
author has relied in some crucial way on a study known to be
unreliable, he or she will not be able to keep the citation; indeed,
either a "revise and resubmit" or a rejection will likely result.
Thus, we see very different approaches to issues of accuracy
and authority in the social sciences and the law. For the social
scientist, it is often quite confusing to witness what amounts to almost
a form of agnosticism on the part of many legal professionals: when
reading legal texts, their core mission is not to determine "what
actually happened," but rather to determine whether the legal-textual
ordering of authority has been satisfied. The details of social context
36. See id. at 75-79; see also EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 11 (manuscript at 16-17
(Chapter 2)).
37. This is by no means to cast aspersions on the students' practices, but rather is simply
an observation on the different kind of tradition of documentation and reasoning to which they
are being trained. They are by now quite expert in the legal tradition that requires precise
textual documentation. They have not been trained to assess, for example, the merits of one kind
of social science methodology over another, and so are not (and should not be) expected to
perform the role played by peer reviewers of social science journals (who are generally professors
with many years of training and research experience with the methods in question). Those same
peer reviewers, of course, would usually not be well-trained in assessing whether a legal citation
is correct. Thus we are talking about different kinds of expertise in different professional
traditions.
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are important only as they fit into legal categories decreed by
precedential tests or statutory requirements. After all, it is not
generally up to an appellate judge to decide what happened, nor is it
up to any particular attorney to decide whether a previously-decided
case was fair. "Thinking like a lawyer" requires that an attorney be
able to step nimbly among a variety of positions, and it is possible that
none of them resembles the attorney's own personal stance.
Erving Goffman usefully introduced the concept of "footing,"
which helps distinguish the various positions that a person may
occupy in any given segment of speech.38 For example, Goffman
delineates a number of distinct positions occupied by producers of
language: the person who is speaking is the "animator," the person
who composed the words spoken is the "author," and the person who is
responsible for the position expressed by the utterance is the
"principal."39 This concept of "footing" allows us to analyze signals
about speakers' positions, relationships, and social power-signals
quietly conveyed in the micro-details of language. Goffman refers to a
shift in footing as "a change in our frame for events."40 Greg Matoesian
has used detailed linguistic analysis to demonstrate how changes of
footing in rape trials shift the frames within which defendants' actions
are understood.
41
What can we make of the way footing is used in law school
teaching? Let us begin by examining a dialogue between professor and
student:
TRANSCRIPT #1 [4/32/14-15]42
Prof: [... ] But of course it does put Ever-Tite Roofing in an excellent situation. They
draft the terms of the offer and they decide whether to accept it or not, you know.
They're like, "You want a deal? Sure. Maybe not." They-they're playing both sides.
Now, urn, how long after the offer is given from the Greens to Ever-Tite Roofing, uh, do
we get the commencement of performance in the case? I think it's nine days, right?
Mr. M.: Right.
Prof. Then nine days later, Ever-Tite Roofing packs up the truck and heads for the
Greens. But what happens when they get there?
Ms. L.: Someone else is there ().
38. ERVING GOFFMAN, FORMS OF TALK 128 (1981).
39. Id. at 144-45.
40. Id. at 128.
41. GREGORY MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY: DISCOURSE IN THE
WILLIAM KENNEDY SMITH RAPE TRIAL (2001).
42. MERTZ, supra note 8, at 102.
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Prof.: Someone else is already on the job. Okay? The Greens' arguments are really two, it
seems to me. One: "Our offer expired. It lapsed. There's nothing out there to accept
anymore. You waited too long." The court doesn't buy that one. Uh, two: "The offer's still
valid, but you haven't accepted yet." That second argument, Ms. L., was really an
argument about what that phrase means in the offer, "commencement of performance,"
isn't it? According to the Greens, what would commencement of performance have been?
Ms. L.: Um, well, after showing up at the house, saying, "Okay, you can start"-
Prof: -and actually nailing some nails, you know, or pulling out some asbestos. Right?
Actually commencing the roof. What they did looks an awful lot like what the carpenter,
builder, did in the White case, White against Corlies. The owner in this case, the Greens,
would certainly argue that's true. They argue that there's been no commencement of
performance. But the court doesn't agree with that, right? The court construes
commencement of performance as including loading up the truck with the material and
heading out there. Okay? [... ]
In this classroom exchange, one could argue that both professor
and student occupy the footing of animators: when using direct
quotation, they appear to be merely speaking the words, which were
actually authored by characters in the story. However, it is also clear
that both professor and student are putting words into these
characters' mouths, and thus stand in the footing of authors as well as
animators. On the other hand, this authorship is hidden, albeit thinly,
by the meta-linguistic signals that accompany direct quotation.
43
There are a number of subtle ideological messages conveyed by the
frequent use of fictionalized reported speech in law school classrooms:
First, the use of reported speech blurs the boundaries between
animator and author footings. This conveys a quiet message about the
power of legal discourse to put words in people's mouths-indeed, to
create reality through discourse. As we have seen, the translation of
events into "facts" in legal narratives creates a legally authoritative
account of truth. Under the linguistic ideology that anchors this
translation process, it is the layers of legal-textual authority to which
one should look in determining the "truth" of events, rather than to
social context. In the law school classroom, use of imagined direct
quotation has already begun to loosen the anchoring of reported
speech from its "original" speaker and context, substituting instead
the primacy of legally-relevant argument and strategy. In developing
the background characterizations of the personae who make legal
43. Direct quotation in this instance retains the linguistic markers of an "original" speech
setting: of a reported speech setting that is distinct from the current, reporting context.
Therefore, when we directly quote someone (He said, "I'll go now"), we represent the speech that
we are reporting using the same pronouns, tense, etc. as the supposed original utterance. If we
were to indirectly quote someone (He said that he would go then), we alter these deictic markers
("I" to "he," "will go" to "would go," and "now" to "then"). For this reason, direct quotation gives
the impression of reanimating an original utterance with greater accuracy.
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arguments, it is strategic reasoning (locating them in terms of those
legal arguments) that matters. The most important aspect of the
parties in these stories is their position in legally-defined landscapes
of argument: of legal speech and language. 44 In learning how to
determine what this position is (or should be), law students are often
taught to proceed as if strategic considerations were already part of
the characters' internal or external dialogue throughout the entire
story. When explicating the story through a legal lens, professors in
essence move these characters around in a strategic landscape,
placing them (and speaking for them) in one location or another to see
how different positions might affect the shape of the arguments they
can make.
Interestingly, this free attribution of fictionalized locutions to
characters in the story can exist side-by-side with a demand for great
precision about what was actually said. As Matoesian has pointed out,
precise repetition of previous utterances is highly valued in a number
of legal contexts: for example, in trials, as a means of impeaching
witnesses who produce "inconsistent" renditions of the same events. 45
Similarly, law professors may sometimes insist that students repeat
precise aspects of written or spoken language that are legally crucial
(for example, to establishing whether there was "acceptance" of a
contract, or what the court specifically said).46 In fact, a hallmark of
the legal reading taught to law students is this combination of blurred
and precise boundaries: of obsessive attention to detail regarding some
issues, and yet also a permission to generalize without systematic
evidence about others.47 Here we find a similar approach, bewildering
to the layperson, but entirely explicable within the bounds of legal
epistemology: if the precise wording of a document or utterance is
doctrinally important, then a proficient legal reader will focus on the
exact phrasing involved. However, when developing a legal
characterization of the players in the story-moving them about in
order to locate them strategically and in terms of possible arguments
they might make-we can freely imagine what they might have said.
This process teaches us that it is the strategies and arguments used
44. For an eloquent discussion of this issue that resonates with this view of "legal
personae," see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (Univ. of Cal. Press 2002) (1976).
45. MATOESIAN, supra note 41, at 105, 155-59.
46. See, e.g., MERTZ, supra note 8, at 54 ("It was appealed, you say. Did you find that word
anywhere ... ?"); id. at 69 ("Does the court ever say... 'And then we know for a fact that Dr.
McGee said, quote...' Does the court ever say that?"); see also EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note
11 (manuscript at 26-28, 35 (Chapter 2)) (giving examples of law school dialogues centered on the
precise wording in cases and on terms such as "firm offer" and "illusory promise").
47. MERTZ, supra note 8, at 84-96 (Chapter 5).
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that centrally define the characters in this legal version of the
narrative.
48
Law professors are also conveying a second message through
the ubiquitous use of reported speech, in that they are presenting the
case through other people's voices, just as attorneys do in court
(although courtroom attorneys use a somewhat different linguistic
apparatus). In court, attorneys create an authoritative version of the
"facts" by developing competing stories via the utterances of
witnesses. Attorneys attempt to shape these utterances, selecting
particular witnesses and coaching them to present the story that is
most favorable to their side. The witnesses often give the appearance
of being both authors and animators of the stories they tell, but the
attorneys in fact share the author role, not only through coaching
witnesses, but also because they actually co-produce the narrative as
they elicit testimony from witnesses through questioning. However,
this co-production remains somewhat covert, because overt meta-
linguistic markers frequently signal that the witness is the main
author of the narrative. Thus the attorney's questions often appear as
mere prompts and the answers as the "real" narrative.49 Just as with
professors' use of direct quotation, lawyers' authorship is frequently
hidden behind a thin meta-linguistic covering. In court, witnesses
produce their own "direct" locutions, which the attorney may then
repeat as direct quotations in subsequent questions-a process that
conceals the role the attorney played in producing the witnesses'
original utterance. Thus, there is a covert linguistic ideology at work
in this deployment of direct quotation, one that foregrounds an
inauthentic authorship and hides the complex play of social power and
discursive maneuvering that really controls the utterance. Matoesian
has pointed out that this legal-linguistic ideology plays a role in
obscuring and naturalizing "how the law-in-action tacitly incorporates
forms of social power, and how it constructs claims to knowledge,
truth, and facticity in the details of discursive interaction."
50
A third subtle message conveyed through use of direct
quotation by professors is the primacy of the dialogic (and/or question-
answer) form in legal discourse. 51 Dialogue is central in courtrooms.
48. Note that it is the attorney's job to figure this out and put the appropriate words in the
characters' mouths.
49. This is obviously much more the case with well-prepared direct examinations of
"friendly" witnesses than with overtly hostile cross-examination of the opposing side's witnesses.
50. MATOESIAN, supra note 41, at 107.
51. There is a difference between two-part discourse structure in question-answer form and
true dialogue. Dialogue, as delineated in seminal work by literary theorist Bakhtin, is typically
understood to embody two distinct voices, whereas it is possible for two people to use question-
answer structure to produce a story that is essentially told in a single voice. See MIKHAIL
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Facts and truth emerge in legal discourse largely through the
structure of two-part linguistic exchanges. Overall, the U.S. legal
system relies on an adversarial process-a clash of opposing discursive
positions-for its legitimacy. Two-part exchanges are also
instrumental in arriving at legal truths during exchanges between
attorneys and witnesses in direct- and cross-examination and between
opposing attorneys as they make objections and tell competing stories
in opening and closing arguments. We even find this format in written
legal opinions, when judges create dialogues between two opposing
positions as a way of explaining the steps that lead to their decisions.
In law school classrooms, professors not only rely heavily on two-part
exchanges with students, but they also create dialogues within their
own speech through use of direct quotation:
TRANSCRIPT #2 [2/16/12]52
Prof.: Okay, okay, or to put it more simply, the company in Indiana is saying, "Listen, we
got this law in Indiana that is essentially for the benefit of the commonwealth of
Indiana; it says that people who do business here can be made subject to Indiana's law."
And, the plaintiff is saying, "This Florida company is doing business here in Indiana."
Right? And the defendant Florida company is saying, "Forget that, I don't do business
here in Indiana, I don't even have shop in Indiana." And it's a little bit unclear, actually,
as to the way the court sort of smooshes together its statutory analysis and its
constitutional analysis. What the court means to say is, "One. The statute does not seem
to apply. Indiana says that companies that do business in Indiana are subject to
Indiana's jurisdiction, but, it doesn't seem as though this statute applies given the facts
of this case because this doesn't seem to be a company doing business in Indiana." The
court then cites to a whole bunch of federal Supreme Court cases and uses the term "due
process." And, what the court really means to say there is, "Even if a judge were to view
Indiana's statute as giving jurisdiction to a court under these circumstances, that
statute itself would be unconstitutional; it would be unfair to make this Florida cor( )
answer to this Indiana corporation in Indiana since this Florida corporation, you know,
didn't have any- wasn't really doing business in Indiana." Okay. Let's just- okay. Then,
after having discussed that stuff and again ( ) that's due- just a jurisdictional issue,
statutory, constitutional. Then the court says, "But, that doesn't end the issue for us,"
right? There may be another basis on which- there may be another basis on which the
court can exercise jurisdiction in this case, and what's that other basis? Yeah.
Student: Well, the plaintiff, the seller (con)tends that "because there is no contract, allow the
personal jurisdiction because, there is a separate clause and additional term that says
that in any dispute, that Indiana has jurisdiction over Florida."
This short excerpt contains a wealth of interesting linguistic
detail. In the first part of this turn, the professor vividly summarizes
BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 284 (1981) ("In any actual dialogue the rejoinder also
leads such a double life: it is structured and conceptualized in the context of the dialogue as a
whole, which consists of its own utterances ['own' from the point of view of the speaker] and of
alien utterances [those of the partner]."). I am indebted to Michael Silverstein for this
observation.
52. MERTZ, supra note 8, at 106-07.
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the primary arguments on each side using turn-internal dialogue. He
glides easily between the opposing sides, demonstrating for students
the art of moving between (and appropriating) different voices. The
footing in this passage is complicated and difficult to parse. On the one
hand, this is not wholly fictional dialogue, because the professor is
purporting to translate arguments presented in the text of the opinion.
The professor can therefore more credibly appear to be a mere
(re)animator here than could the professor in the previous excerpt. On
the other hand, this professor is clearly not attempting a precise or
literal translation, and so a peculiar exactitude is given by use of
direct quotation here to what is at best a very loose rendering of what
was actually said or written. The footing becomes still more
convoluted when a third interlocutor, the court, enters the discussion.
The professor introduces the court's voice while also overtly indicating
that he is clarifying a confusion in the court's own text: "And it's a
little bit unclear, actually, as to the way the court sort of smooshes
together its statutory analysis and its constitutional analysis. What
the court means to say is .... ." The apparent use of direct quotation
following this meta-linguistic frame ("what the court means to say")
can be understood as a signal that the professor is giving us the "real"
message encoded in the confused language of the opinion. This
reverses the typical metapragmatic convention under which direct
quotation replicates the overt form of a message (the exact words)
rather than conveying its gist (that is, its core semantic meaning). At
the end of the exchange above, the student responds to the professor
with a fabricated quotation that loosely represents the plaintiffs
argument-based perspective.
Law professors, then, use direct quotation to create a form of
dialogue within their own turns, at times creating imagined
discussions between two different people. These professors might also
speak to themselves within a single turn: first asking and then
answering their own questions. Or, they might employ a mix of the
two, asking themselves a question but answering using reported




Prof.: What's- what's a very reasonable alternative interpretation of the first term, "first
come, first served"? "As the entire metropolitan area lines up to purchase coffee at 49
cents a tin, we will wait on you and take your money in the same order of which you
appear." So that's why that's not going to-that's not going to change it. That's not an
indication [ .. ] Okay, how 'bout if it says, everything that we've suggested previously,
53. Id. at 108.
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says "One per customer, one per customer"? Offer or no offer? Now, again, you cannot
answer the question without measuring it against the legal rationale. Is there still a
potential for theoretical unlimited demand in this type of problem? Yes. It's not as easy
knowing you can come in there and start ordering it by the carload and trainload. [... ]
In this turn, the professor initially asks himself a question
about reasonable alternative interpretations of a directly quoted
phrase. 54 He answers himself with an unframed quotation. Although
there is no frame to indicate the use of direct quotation here, it is
nonetheless clearly signaled through metapragmatic markers such as
the shifts in pronouns and tense ("we will wait on you" rather than
"they would wait on first-comers"). If we examine this direct quotation
closely, we find that the professor seems to take on the voice of a
business that may or may not have made an offer to customers. He
addresses the entire metropolitan area, using the second person plural
("you"). Of course, we are clearly hearing another voice layered within
this quotation as well, but it is not the professor's own. It is the voice
of one possible interpreter of the written text, a person who does not
necessarily understand the text as the author intended. Following this
double-voiced quotation, the professor goes on to vary the facts,
creating a small hypothetical ("how 'bout if it says.. . 'one per
customer'?"). He then poses another question to himself, "Offer or no
offer?" This question is followed by a brief meta-linguistic instruction
regarding the proper approach to answering these kinds of questions
("Now, again, you cannot answer the question without measuring it
against the legal rationale."). The excerpt concludes with another
question to himself ("Is there potential ... ?"), which he answers
("Yes.").
These transcript excerpts demonstrate how professors use
classroom discourse to convey the primacy of dialogic and/or question-
answer form in legal language and thought. Notice that thought and
language, again, remain thoroughly intertwined in the indigenous,
legal-linguistic ideology. The message is that both external and
internal dialogues play an important role in the transformation to a
new professional identity for law students. They must gain a new
capacity, responding to and initiating argumentative dialogue with
others and using internal dialogue structured around the posing of a
series of questions to analyze legal texts. This is at once a structure of
discourse and of thought. By mid-semester in these law school
classrooms, the students have begun to adopt the format in their
responses to professors' questions (initially using some creative
variations, to be sure). Along with the new discourse format, a tacit
epistemological lesson is conveyed: that legal truth emerges through
54. Note that this is one of the times when replicating the exact wording is important.
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argumentative dialogue, the privileged discursive form in this legal
domain. The students are taught again and again to first position
themselves on one side, pose the appropriate questions, then to take
the other side of the argument. From engaging in this ongoing debate,
students will learn to internalize a new form of reasoning-"thinking
like a lawyer"-as they also learn to perform externally (that is, to
speak) the parts required by their new identities as lawyers. At a
larger level, this adversarial process is the means by which legal
truths and facts are ascertained, and it is the means by which law
obtains legitimacy in the wider society, by ensuring that both sides are
represented, using seemingly neutral legal categories. Thought,
identity, truth, and legitimacy are packaged powerfully together
through meta-linguistic structure.
On the other hand, this very focus on language form creates a
closed linguistic system that is capable of devouring all manner of
social detail, but without budging in its core assumptions. This creates
a vivid contrast between the law and the social sciences, which often
demand that researchers remain open to revising core assumptions. If
the data are in conflict with your pet theory, unfortunately, in the long
run, it is probably your theory and not the data that will have to go.
By contrast, an attorney is required to hold onto his or her client's
interests and to contest any data that might get in the way. As
Professor Epstein and Professor King have noted, "An attorney who
treats a client like a hypothesis would be disbarred; a Ph.D. who
advocates a hypothesis like a client would be ignored."55 This means
that there is a fundamental difficulty in introducing forms of
epistemological humility into legal thinking. The ubiquitous hedging
and modesty with which well-regarded social scientists present their
conclusions frequently seem like a dangerous luxury to those engaged
in legal pursuits. Yet, a more subtle and sophisticated understanding
of the social world could arguably contribute to better legal outcomes,
if we could only find a good bridge between the two discourses and
worlds.
3. The Carnegie Foundation Report on Law School Education
Although a detailed discussion of the forthcoming Carnegie
Foundation report must await its publication, I pause here to note
some strong similarities between that report's conclusions and the
findings of my study.5 6 The Carnegie Foundation's report, too, found a
55. Lee Epstein and Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002).
56. See supra notes 11 & 18 for descriptions of the Carnegie Report's approach to gathering
information.
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distinctive style of law school pedagogy, with clear roots in Socratic
teaching, across the sixteen law schools that they studied. They
identified this "signature pedagogy" of legal education as the "case-
dialogue method," and noted that "nearly all of the law faculty with
whom we spoke [were] proponents" of this approach.57
The Carnegie team analyzed four dimensions of this signature
pedagogy: its surface structure (observable behavioral features), its
deep structure (underlying ideas modeled by this behavior), its tacit
structure (values it implicitly conveys), and its shadow structure (the
pedagogy that is missing or weakly conveyed). 58 Just as in my own
study, they found that the surface structure was characterized by
dialogic verbal exchanges (or sometimes duels), centered primarily on
a new reading of legal texts. The deep structure of law school
pedagogy links this dialogic process to a core analytic ability which is
deemed central to lawyers' professional identity. And, again
paralleling my results, the Carnegie team identified a tacit message in
legal education's signature pedagogy: that law's key task is effective
translation of the "human world" using legal categories. 59
As a result of this focus on legal categorization and reasoning
in law school, the law students who spoke with the Carnegie
researchers reported that they experienced several gaps-several
missing pieces in current legal pedagogy. One is substantive ethical
teaching, and the other is a strong preparation for the realities of legal
practice (generally conveyed only to those students who take clinical
courses). The Carnegie team notes:
Professional education is... inherently ethical education in the deep and broad
sense.... Even to disparage any ethical intent is to declare one: the purely instrumental
view of education as the acquisition of a set of tools by means of which to enhance one's
competitive advantage in life. Ethics in a professional curriculum ought to provide a
context in which students and faculty alike can grasp and discuss, as well as practice,
the core commitments that define the profession. It can also be a place where the
alternative, instrumental view just described can be squarely reckoned with. For
lawyers, just as for other professionals, the practices they learn give them extraordinary
powers. But the meaning of the practices, and, so, the object to which the powers are
directed, is never morally neutral. 6 0
It is heartening, as an empirical researcher, to find that others
who are observing the same phenomenon have come to some very
similar results. First, I share with the Carnegie researchers the
conclusion that there is a shared epistemology under-girding legal
education, at least in the United States. This in no way denies the
57. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 11 (manuscript at 3-6 (Chapter 1), 29 (Chapter 2)).
58. Id. (manuscript at 5 (Chapter 1)).
59. Id. (manuscript at 29 (Chapter 2)).
60. Id. (manuscript at 14 (Chapter 1)).
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vast array of variations and differences that we can also track in
today's law school classrooms. But both research teams located a
central pedagogical set of messages conveyed to law students,
messages that direct their attention to technical aspects of legal
reading and categorization. We also both agree that this approach is
not entirely neutral, and that this lack of neutrality remains largely
tacit in U.S. law schools' standard pedagogical practices.
However, I share the Carnegie group's conclusion that there is
something of value that can be found alongside the tacit problems
involved in law's "signal pedagogy." Like pedagogical practices in
other professional schools, the "case-dialogue method" captures some
key aspects of the profession's culture, and conveys them using a
powerful mirroring (the form of the pedagogy in some way echoing the
message it seeks to convey). 61 Arguably there is a tension, at least in
the Anglo-American system of justice, between a push toward
abstraction (an attempt to limit discretion, and to provide a metric for
consistent decisions that in their best moments rise above local
prejudice) and the need to contextualize (so that the equities of
individual cases can be considered, and justice achieved). The
Carnegie report characterizes this tension as a conflict between
analytical and narrative modes. 62 It recognizes the need to train law
students in the analytical mode:
Legal education.., needs to train students in the analytical mode of thought, with its
reliance upon formal procedures and general theories and ideas. Like engineering or
medicine, facility in the law requires an ability to distance oneself from everyday
contexts and meanings, and to concentrate upon abstract cognitive features of the
environment .... 63
On the other hand, the Carnegie researchers also point out
that law operates as a "normative lattice" in U.S. society. 64 When
lawyers play their roles in sustaining this lattice, they of necessity
61. Linguistic anthropologists would speak of this as an "indexical icon"; that is, the speech
at once points to and mirrors ("iconism") what it seeks to convey. See MERTZ, supra note 8, at 58,
245 n.38; Mertz, Recontextualization as Socialization, supra note 19, at 231; Parmentier, supra
note 24, at 281, 284; Silverstein, supra note 24, at 9; see also supra text accompanying note 24.
The core terminology derives from the work of Charles Sanders Peirce. CHARLES S. PEIRCE,
COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., vols.
I-VI, Belknap Press of Havard University Press 1974) (1931-1935). For more technical
discussions, see Michael Silverstein, Indexical Order and the Dialectics of Sociolinguistic Life, 23
LANGUAGE & COMM. 193, 203 (2003); Michael Silverstein, The Poetics of Politics: "Theirs" and
"Ours", 61 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 1, 3 (2005).
62. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 11 (manuscript at 53-54 (Chapter 2)). Robert Burns
gives a powerful analysis of how the trial can function to balance competing demands in the U.S.
system of justice, and of the role of narrative in this balancing. ROBERT BURNS, A THEORY OF THE
TRIAL 35-72 (2001).
63. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 11 (manuscript at 53-54 (Chapter 2)).
64. Id. (manuscript at 54 (Chapter 2)).
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deal with narrative, with context, with equities and justice. Not only
does the signal pedagogy of U.S. law fail to deal systematically with
these issues, but instead, as the Carnegie report points out, "the case
dialogue's emphasis on formal and procedural issues" tends to convey
a contrary message: that questions of policy and justice are peripheral
to the central business of law. 65 As I have noted, balancing the difficult
demands of this ongoing tension is a key question facing any current
efforts at legal educational reform:
At a very broad level, this study has outlined a tension between abstract categories and
conceptions of justice, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the democratic ideals of
inclusion that require social, contextual, and grounded moral reasoning.... There is
without question a certain genius to a linguistic-legal framework that [appears to] treat[
] all individuals the same, in safely abstract layers of legal categories and authorities,
regardless of social identity or context .... At the same time, this process conceals the
ways legal results are often quite reflective of existing power dynamics, while
simultaneously pulling lawyers away from grounded moral judgment and fully
contextualized consideration of human conflict.
6 6
One of the reasons that this remains a daunting challenge is
that the system of reasoning is itself linguistically closed in a curious
way, as we have seen. On the one hand, it seems open to almost
everything. There is no event, no corner of society, it seems, that
cannot be translated into legal categories. And yet, the pragmatic
system that we find in law school pedagogy closes in on itself at the
point where any challenge to its underlying system of reasoning
arises. Sources of authority outside of the layered legal-textual system
can only enter through the backdoor of jury nullification; standards of
proof that might actually map social reality more accurately can be
heard only in pitched adversarial formats (which then by definition
neutralize alternative metrics of truth in favor of the more powerful
legal advocate). It is very difficult to question the epistemology set in
motion by fluid and strategic legal approaches to footing, identity, and
value: for Native Americans, for example, to assert different legal
epistemologies regarding land or identity, or to convey differing values




66. MERTZ, supra note 8, at 220.
67. See, e.g., Wendy Espeland, Legally Mediated Identity: The National Environmental
Policy Act and the Bureaucratic Construction of Interests, 28 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 1149 (1994);
Susan Staiger Gooding, Place, Race, and Names: Layered Identities in United States v. Oregon,
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Plaintiff-Intervenor, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1181
(1994). Anthropologists have made similar points about the way that the importation of Western
legal norms has at times erased alternative legal measures and epistemologies abroad. See, e.g.,
LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS (2002); Mark Goodale, The
Globalization of Sympathetic Law and Its Consequences, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 595 (2002).
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Similarly, students who attempt to raise issues of fixed values
or non-legal morality do not generally get very far in the classroom
exchanges that my research team recorded.68 The beauty of the system
is also its greatest weakness: once trained, law students can pick up
almost any situation you bring to them and translate it into legal
categories in the same way that their professors do. Discerning the
limits of this translation, however, is quite difficult from within this
incredibly catholic, almost omnivorous system. This is only
exacerbated by the simultaneous demand in legal training that
students learn a kind of assurance-an unflappability, an ability to
think on their feet and to quickly respond to any challenge. Unlike
scholars in some other fields, law professors have not been trained to
ask themselves systematically what their method cannot do, or where
the limits of their approach lie.69 Indeed, the tacit character of the
closure produced by the pragmatic structuring of legal language and
pedagogy only complicates the problem further.
B. Different Classroom Patterns: Whose Voices Are Heard?
We have thus far focused on the way the pragmatics of legal
language, at least as taught in first-year law school classrooms, can
convey a somewhat closed epistemology in and through language.
However, we can also find another kind of premature closure in the
discussions held in law school classrooms: a closing-off in the structure
or form of the classroom discussion itself. In most of the classrooms of
the study, we found that female law students spoke less frequently
than did male students, and we found an even clearer silencing of
minority students. 70 This finding seems to be consistent across most of
the research done to date in law schools, and this is particularly the
case in terms of observational studies.
7 1
68. MERTZ, supra note 8, at 97-137 (Chapter 6).
69. Of course, individual law professors may be quite modest and careful about the limits of
legal training in preparing them to pick up and appropriately use information from other fields
or areas. But when this occurs, it is not because they are employing a systematic method to
which their profession trained them. Nor does law school teach legal professionals to think about
how what they are learning might actually impair their ability to comprehend alternative
epistemologies or approaches. Anthropologists, by contrast, are trained specifically to think
about how working unquestioningly through their own cultural or professional categories could
impair their ability to achieve top-notch analyses of other cultures (or systems of ideas of
whatever kind).
70. See Mertz, Njogu & Gooding, supra note 8, at 45, 62. We use the term "minority" here to
reference a literature that deals with students of color, noting however that the term itself has
limitations; obviously people of color are in a "minority" only in certain societies and settings
(particularly elite settings in the United States). On a world-wide level, the picture is quite
different.
71. See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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Thus, in examining gender dynamics in these classrooms, we
found that men spoke more frequently and for disproportionately more
time than did women in six of the eight classes. 72 Included in the
group of six were all of the classes in the study taught by men, as well
as the only class taught by a female professor in an elite/prestige law
school. The other two classes were both taught by female professors,
but in "local" law schools. Looking to other studies of law school
education, we see that the overwhelming majority of the results
similarly found skewing toward male students in class participation
rates. This is quite clear in the self-report (survey) studies, in which
women students have repeatedly reported lower rates of participation
and self-confidence, along with higher levels of distress.73 There have
only been a few observational studies of law school training, and these
have generally been conducted by the students themselves. Student-
led observational efforts at the law schools of Yale, Harvard, and the
University of Chicago in recent years still found differential
participation by male and female students, although faculty members
at Yale report improvements in classroom gender balancing over
time. 74
72. For detailed tables and discussion, see Mertz, Njogu & Gooding, supra note 8, at 45-56.
Male students in these six classrooms took proportionately from 10% to 54% more turns than did
female students, and from 12% to 38% more time speaking. Id.
73. This result has been largely consistent in self-report studies from 1986 through the
present. See LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 27-84 (1997); YALE LAW WOMEN, supra note 14, at 13-19, 29-33, 81;
Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137, 141-44 (1988);
Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527, 540 (1990)
[hereinafter Banks 2]; Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders
Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 50 (1990); Joan Krauskopf,
Touching the Elephant: Perceptions of Gender Issues in Nine Law Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC.
311, 314, 325-326 (1994); Neufeld, supra note 14, at 540-41, 548-50; Janet Taber et al., Gender,
Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and
Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1239 (1988); see also LINDA WIGHTMAN, WOMEN IN LEGAL
EDUCATION: A COMPARISON OF THE LAW SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCES
OF WOMEN AND MEN 54-59 (1996); Marsha Garrison et al., Succeeding in Law School: A
Comparison of Women's Experiences at Brooklyn Law School and the University of Pennsylvania,
3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 515, 520, 525 (1996); Roseanna McCleary & Evan Zucker, Higher Trait-
and State-Anxiety in Female Law Students than Male Law Students, 68 PSYCHOL. REP. 1075,
1075-77 (1991); Daniel McIntosh et al., Stress and Health in First-Year Law Students: Women
Fare Worse, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1474, 1483-90 (1994); James Ogloff et al., More Than
'Learning to Think Like a Lawyer'- The Empirical Research on Legal Education, 34 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 73, 195 (2000); E.R. Robert & M.F. Winter, Sex-Role and Success in Law School, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 449, 450, 452-54 (1978). But see Mitu Gulati, Richard Sander & Robert Sockloskie,
The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination of the Third Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 235, 251-54 (2001) for a study that found diminution of student distress generally by the
third year. On Yale faculty comments regarding an improving situation for women, see YALE
LAW WOMEN, supra note 14, at 13, 15.
74. There have been very few efforts at observational research. See YALE LAW WOMEN,
supra note 14, at 6; Alice Jacobs, Women in Law School: Structural Constraint and Personal
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In terms of race, we found some dramatic relative
disproportions in favor of white students, ranging as high as 289%.
75
Interestingly, students of color took more turns, proportionate to their
numbers in class, in the two classes taught by professors of color.
76
These were also classes in which there were substantial cohorts of
minority students. There was one other classroom in which students of
color participated at rates greater than would be expected, given their
relative proportion in the class: this class was taught by a white male
professor in a "regional" law school using a modified Socratic teaching
style. 77 Just as with studies of gender in law schools, previous studies
that examined race have raised concerns about inclusiveness in legal
education. Self-report studies have generally painted a picture of
lower in-class participation by students of color than by white
students, coupled with more negative reactions to law school and
lower self-esteem.7 8 A number of reports indicate the likelihood,
however, that African-American students who attended historically
black law schools have had a different experience. 79 This finding and
Choice in the Formation of Professional Identity, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 462, 462-63 (1972); Neufeld,
supra note 14, at 522; Weiss & Melling, supra note 14, at 1299; Wilson & Levin, supra note 14, at
3; Mary Becker, How to Do a Gender Study at Your Law School (And Why It Might Be a Good
Idea) 14-15 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reporting results of study at
University of Chicago Law School). For an overview of the relevant literature on women's
experiences in law school, see MERTZ, supra note 8, at 185-95.
75. Mertz, Njogu & Gooding, supra note 8, at 62. For a more detailed overall analysis of
race and classroom participation, see id. at 61-75.
76. Id. at 62.
77. Id. at 67. I analyze the classroom dynamics in this particular class in great detail in
MERTZ, supra note 8, at 141-73 (Chapter 7). The participation profile in this course stands as a
useful reminder of the complexities involved in analyzing classroom dynamics; this professor is
particularly expert in providing facilitating frameworks for students (aspects of which would, in
the Carnegie report's language, be termed "scaffolding" and "coaching"). Our results suggest that
a number of factors are likely at work in creating encouraging environments for students of color;
the presence of professors of color provides a source of role modeling that may help redefine
"outsider" status, while the skillful use of pedagogical tools, even in combination with Socratic
dialogue, may also be useful. This only underscores a general point made in the literature, which
is that the very same steps that build a better learning environment for women and students of
color will often benefit all students.
78. See, e.g., Banks 2, supra note 73, at 535-36 (finding students of color more likely to
report lack of respect and offensive humor by professors); GUINIER ET AL., supra note 73, at 135
n.114 (explaining that students of color report racially intimidating language in law school
classrooms); Homer & Schwartz, supra note 73, at 47-55 (stating that white male students report
higher levels of classroom participation, self-esteem, and positive reactions to law school
pedagogy than other students); Krauskopf, supra note 73, at 314 (concluding that students of
color differentially report harassment and silencing). Mitu Gulati, Richard Sander, and Robert
Sockloskie found that students of color were generally satisfied with their law school
experiences, but that minority students were overrepresented among the small pockets of
students who reported deep dissatisfaction. Gulati, Sander & Sockloski, supra note 73, at 255.
79. See, e.g., William Boyd, Legal Education: A Nationwide Study of Minority Law Students
1974, 4 BLACK L.J. 527, 539, 542 (1975) (noting that law schools "which have more experience
with minority students have learned how to provide effective academic assistance where it is
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the results of my research together support the hypothesis that black
students talk more freely and contribute more substantially when
they have both cohorts and professors of color available to them for
support.
Thus, both in terms of race and gender, existing empirical
research indicates that law schools are not yet even playing fields for
all students. On the other hand, there are some interesting variations.
As noted, in my study, female students spoke as much or more than
would be predicted by their share of the class size in the two classes
taught by female professors in non-elite schools.8 0 Along with other
researchers, we did not find that the encouraging effect of female law
professors was as great in more elite schools, leaving us with a
question about the interaction of school status with gender.8' By
contrast, students of color spoke more in classes taught by professors
of color even in elite schools.8 2 They emerged as the leading speakers
only in classes where there were professors of color and substantial
needed, but less experienced institutions have not," and also that the "lack of minority presence
fosters the sense of being unwanted and isolated"); Timothy Clydesdale, A Forked River Runs
Through Law School: Toward Understanding Race, Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law
School Performance and Bar Passage, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 711, 744 (2004) (finding that key
factors influencing final law student GPAs include "quality instruction, faculty race diversity,
and faculty gender diversity"); Portia Y.T. Hamlar, Minority Tokenism in American Law Schools,
26 How. L.J. 443, 532-54, 576 (1983) (explaining that minority students who are tokens
experience differential stress and silencing in law school, and citing a MALDEF study that
discusses need for "critical mass" in order for minority law students to feel comfortable);
Cathaleen Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping into the Informational Stream to Move
Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 667, 675 (1994) ("Minority law students
[in predominantly white law schools] experience acute isolation, which in turn, produces serious
psychological and academic ramifications."); Kenneth Tollett, Black Institutions of Higher
Learning: Inadvertent Victims or Necessary Sacrifices?, 3 BLACK L.J. 162, 165-167 (1973) (finding
that Black higher educational institutions provide uniquely supportive environments for African-
American students, including better role models, superior cultural and psycho-social settings,
and "educational enclaves" that help them transition to the largely white professional
mainstream).
In his article, Professor Clydesdale further wrote:
Those students with higher final GPAs were more likely to report better instructional
quality, more minority instructors, and more women instructors.... Faculty at most
law schools must follow standardized grading distributions; thus, one can reasonably
infer that students who have race and gender diverse instructors actually perform
better academically. This is an important finding, as it supports the 'critical mass'
argument in the Grutter decision and deserves thoughtful attention by legal educators
and social scientists alike.
Clydesdale, supra, at 744.
In other higher educational settings, studies have shown that African-American students
who attended black colleges are more successful. JACQUELINE FLEMING, BLACKS IN COLLEGE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STUDENTS' SUCCESS IN BLACK AND IN WHITE INSTITUTIONS (1984).
80. Mertz, Njogu & Gooding, supra note 8, at 46.
81. Id. at 48-49; MERTZ, supra note 8, at 190-96.
82. Mertz, Njogu & Gooding, supra note 8, at 65.
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cohorts of students of color.8 3 This should raise some cautionary
concerns about how important substantial cohorts and role models are
for students of color attending elite law schools (from whose ranks
future law professors at all kinds of law schools are most likely to
emerge).8 4 In general, this study points to the importance of fine-
grained attention to aspects of context, from the differences among
kinds of law schools through the quite different atmospheres created
by the divergent discourse styles used by the professors we observed.
5
Looking at both the qualitative and quantitative results of this
study, we can see that the backbone of legal language sends powerful
messages to law students, along a number of different dimensions.
Starting with an examination of formative experiences in law school,
we can use a better-informed understanding of the messages conveyed
in language structure to open up legal discourse-both in form and
content-to more voices and perspectives. This should have obvious
benefits for the legal system in a nominally democratic society.
8 6
III. LAW, TRANSLATION, AND HUMILITY: TOWARD A NEW LEGAL
REALIST PEDAGOGY
In summary, detailed linguistic analysis permits us to specify a
shared message that is found across a number of apparent differences
in law school classrooms. This message is all the more powerful
because it is frequently conveyed tacitly, in a subtle process of meta-
linguistic reorientation. This linguistically-circumscribed system of
legal knowledge turns students' attention toward technical and
textual concerns, quietly deflecting or suspending questions of
substantive justice. Despite its faqade, the law school classroom is the
site of more than lessons about technical law. Educational research in
other settings has demonstrated that the structure of classroom
interactions affects how we "create settings in which students can
learn lessons of caring, justice, and self-worth."87 Clearly, in a field
such as law, these lessons are even more obviously part of what
students will carry away with them.
In today's law school, there is no systematic analysis or
teaching of the limitations that are tacitly built into the very
83. Id. at 66-67.
84. For a more extended discussion of this issue, see MERTZ, supra note 8, at 220-22.
85. Mertz, Njogu & Gooding, supra note 8, at 77-86.
86. See SusAN DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF 24-50 (2004) for a discussion of the
arguable gap that exists between lawyers' understandings and those of the laypeople they
purport to serve.
87. Carol Weinstein, The Classroom as a Social Context for Learning, 42 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 493, 519 (1991).
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framework of legal language. As we have seen, by taking an
empirically formed perspective, we can begin the process of developing
that analysis and pedagogy. In so doing, we can shake up conventional
understandings of legal language, and of the law itself. Like all human
language, legal language is embedded in a particular setting, shaped
by the social contexts and institutions surrounding it. It does not
convey abstract meaning in a legally-created vacuum, and thus cannot
be understood without systematic study of the contextual molding that
gives it foundation in particular cultures and societies. Here social
science can be of help to the law, because it specializes in just this
kind of systematic study. No profession can do everything; no
scholarly discipline can cover all facets of human life. When we cross
disciplines in an effort to enlarge our understanding, we also have to
recognize the limitations of the methods in which we have been
trained. If we can achieve this recognition, we will begin to develop an
important antidote to the hubris that inheres in standard legal meta-
linguistic assumptions.
Excellent translation, whether across disciplines or among
people, begins with a form of humility: it is only when we recognize
that we do not currently grasp others' perspectives that we can start
to comprehend them. The arrogance that accompanies the closed
linguistic system of law can contribute to the alienation of lawyers and
the legal system from the people they are supposed to serve.
Ironically, learning the apparently universalizing language of law may
actually block those speaking the language of law from truly hearing
alternative points of view. We can trace in legal language a meta-
linguistic structure that is at once powerful and problematic.
Understanding the limitations alongside the power can help law
students be careful about the intoxicating appeal of their new
language. This kind of attention to the translation process itself is the
goal of the New Legal Realism Project.
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